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Why legislatures owe deference to
the courts
A commentary on Dimitrios Kyritsis’ Where our protection lies:




1 In his intriguing book Where Our Protection Lies:  Separation of Powers and Constitutional
Review  Dimitrios  Kyritsis  develops  a  sophisticated  argument  establishing  the
justifiability  of  judicial  review.  Kyritsis’  theory  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the
institutional division of labor between different institutions of governance and their
ramifications  on  the  legitimacy  of  the  polity.  Kyritsis  believes  that  the  governing
institutions are engaged in a single joint enterprise: the enterprise of governing. The
joint commitment to govern is particularly important for his theory as the cooperation,
coordination  and harmony among the  governing  institutions  is  a  central  theme of
Kyritsis’ enterprise. One of the primary duties resulting from joint governance is the
duty of each participant in the enterprise of governance to “respect the contributions
of  their  fellow participants  in  the  joint  institutional  efforts”.1 This  duty  of  respect
implies a duty of ‘robust deference’ on the part of the judges. Robust deference requires
courts to give effect to legislative decisions that are sub-optimal in terms of content. 
2 My  own  commentary exploits  the  concept  of  robust  deference  and  establishes  the
significance of robust legislative deference (deference owed by the legislature to the
court). Legislative deference is required to manifest the fact that legislation operates
within certain boundaries;  the legislature is  not omnipotent;  it  has duties to act  in
certain ways. Judicial review is designed to publicly acknowledge the presence of such
duties and their mandatory force. Judicial review implies that the protection of rights
should not hinge on the good will of the legislature or even on its sound judgments.
Citizens  are  not  at  the  mercy of  the  legislature  and its  will  or  wisdom even when
legislatures are indeed protective of rights. 
Why legislatures owe deference to the courts
Revus, 38 | 2019
1
3 One of the implications of my view is that within a certain sphere, a liberal polity ought
to  defer  to  courts  even  when  courts  are  not  superior  in  their  epistemic  (or  more
generally instrumentalist) competence, namely even when courts do not make better
decisions  than legislatures.  By  doing  so,  courts  protect  not  (only  or  primarily)  the
rights  of  citizens  (as  those  often  can  be  protected  by  legislatures)  but  the
understanding that rights do not hinge on the good will  or the sound judgment of
legislatures. 
4 After  describing  in  Part  2  Kyritsis’  views  concerning  institutional  legitimacy  and
Kyritsis’ concept of robust judicial deference, Part 3 develops and defends the concept
of robust legislative deference. 
 
2 Institutional legitimacy and robust judicial deference
5 The ultimate normative desideratum that the governing institutions ought to realize is
political  legitimacy.  Legitimacy  requires  political  institutions  to  satisfy  a  minimum
threshold;  not  any  deviation  from  justice  undermines  the  legitimacy  of  these
institutions.2 As Kyritsis says legitimacy is “what you get when the quest for justice
comes up against the basic realities of political life”.3 
6 Legitimacy,  as  understood  by  Kyritsis  can  be  achieved  only  by  satisfying  both
institutional  and substantive  conditions.  The  substantive  conditions  concern  the
primary  rules  governing  the  polity:  these  rules  ought  to  be  minimally  just.  The
institutional concerns are more central to Kyritsis’ project as Kyritsis believes (and I am
also an enthusiastic proponent of the view) that institutional concerns are not parasitic
upon substantive ones. In Kyritsis’ view, defects of content or quality can sometimes be
legitimate  when  they  result  from  counter-availing  considerations  of  institutional
design.  In  other  words,  institutional  values  can  sometimes  require  us  to  defer  to
institutions  that  are  not  epistemically  superior  (or  perhaps  even  are  epistemically
inferior). The institutional concerns that are of primary interest to Kyritsis are those
that govern the relations between the legislature and the courts. 
7 In a carefully articulated observation Kyritsis argues: 
Courts cannot just ask themselves what would be the optimal decision from the
point of view of fundamental rights protection. They must also take into account
that  they are  partners  in  a  project  that  they share  with the  other  branches  of
government.4
8 Hence, Kyritsis concludes judges “are bound to respect the contributions of their fellow
participants in the joint institutional effort”.5 Such a respect entails a duty of ‘robust
deference’ on the part of the courts to the legislature. Robust deference requires courts
to defer to other institutions (in particular the legislature) even when such a deference
has costs in terms of the quality of the decisions, i.e., even if courts would have made a
better decision than the legislature had they rather than the legislature been given the
power to do so. 
9 Let me articulate the significance of this view by contrasting it with a popular different
instrumentalist view. Some theorists believe that the separation of powers or, more
broadly, the institutional structure of the polity rests purely on epistemic (or more
broadly  instrumental)  reasons.  Epistemic  deference  is  justified  when  different
institutions  have  different  epistemic  competence.  In  such  a  case  the  epistemically
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inferior  institutions  always  owe  a  duty  of  deference  to  the  epistemically  superior
institution. 
10 The epistemic superiority of one institution over another may result from different
reasons.  Sometimes  one  institution  is  particularly  knowledgeable,  informed  or  has
better deliberative powers. At other times a particular institution is more motivated to
make the right decision or is less constrained than other institutions. Hence, under the
instrumentalist  view,  the  division  of  labor  among  different  institutions  must  be
justified  in  epistemic  (or  more  broadly  instrumental)  terms.  The  desirability  of
constitutional  directives  and/or  judicial  review  depends  upon  whether  they  bring
about (or are likely to bring about) decisions that are superior to those that would have
been made in  the  absence of  constitutional  directives  or  in  the  absence of  judicial
review.  This  is  a  theory  of  the  type  that  I  have  labelled  in  the  past  constitutional
instrumentalism.6 
11 Epistemic (or, more broadly, instrumentalist) deference has dominated the discussions
concerning  the  relations  between  the  legislature  and  the  judiciary.  In  the  past  I
identified five influential theories purporting to justify judicial review on epistemic/
instrumental  terms:  rights-based,  democracy-enhancement  theories,  the  settlement
theories  of  judicial  review,  the  dualist  democracy  argument  and  institutionalist
instrumentalism.7 
12 Kyritsis  rightly  recognizes  the  importance  of  epistemic  deference  but  he  also
acknowledges that epistemic deference is not the only type of deference that courts
owe to  the  legislature.  Robust  deference,  namely  deference  that  binds  courts  even
when  epistemic  considerations  are  not  present  is  a  necessary  additional  form  of
deference. Under Kyritsis view: 
Courts cannot just ask themselves what would be the optimal decision from the
point of view of fundamental rights protection. They must also take into account
that  they are  partners  in  a  project  that  they share  with the  other  branches  of
government…By  virtue  of  the  fact  that  judges  participate  in  a  project  that  is
underlain by such considerations, they are bound to respect the contributions of
their  fellow-participants  in  the  joint  institutional  effort.  Sometimes  this  means
giving effect to decisions that are sub-optimal from the point of view of content.8
13 I agree! There are institutional considerations that are not derivative of or parasitic on
the resulting merit of the decisions and which require courts to defer to the legislature.
We do not merely grant powers to legislatures because they are good at what they are
doing; in addition, the legislature has some prerogatives resulting from the fact that it
is a representative institution.9 As a matter of fact, sadly we grant legislatures powers
despite the fact that they are often quite incompetent at what they are doing.  The
question is what can explain our willingness to grant legislatures such broad powers
even when we have grave doubts as to their competence. Why should any consideration
other  than  their  quality  in  decision-making  matter?  This  is  a  primary  puzzle  of
constitutional theory.
14 Much of  Kyritsis’  discussion  addresses  this  point.  In  particular,  chapter  6  provides
valuable contributions explaining the distinct virtues of representative institutions and
chapter 7 provides additional rationales justifying the prerogatives of representative
institutions. I have little to add to this valuable analysis; I wish only to point out that
without explicitly recognizing it, Kyritsis identifies two types of considerations that can
justify judicial (robust) deference to the legislature: conventional and natural. 
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15 The  conventional  deference  results  from  an  (explicit  or  implicit)  agreement  or  a
custom. In illustrating the rationale for robust constraints Kyritsis uses an example to
explain why conventions can give rise to deference. He imagines that two people wish
to paint a home together and they agree that one of them will be painting the living
room while the other will be painting the bedroom. Assume also the former is much
better in painting houses than the latter and, consequently, the former’s interference
will greatly improve the look of the house. Kyritsis believes that it is still the case that
the former has reasons not to interfere in the latter’s work as the point of the joint
endeavor “is to structure cooperation” and not merely to improve the quality of the
house. The success of the joint endeavor (the painting) is important but, in addition,
the  joint  endeavor  contributes  to  the  forging  of  relationship  between  the  two
participants and,  such relationship may require that we sacrifice the quality of  the
painting for the sake of successful cooperation. Similarly, the scope of constitutional
review is not only determined by considerations concerning the quality of the resulting
decisions. Courts should also respect the contribution of their fellow citizens to other
institutions of governance.10 Such respect provides a reason for conventional robust
deference that hinges on the prior agreement or understanding between the different
institutions. 
16 Real life rather than hypothetical examples can illustrate this point. The constitutional
rules governing the allocation of powers among different entitles are conventions of
this type. In the US criminal law is a state matter while in Canada it is a federal matter.
This convention justifies different forms of deference – forms which are determined by
the convention specified in the relevant constitutional provisions. 
17 There  is  however  a  central  limitation  on  conventional  deference.  Conventional
deference  (as  its  name  indicates)  rests  on  a  convention;  its  content  hinges  on  the
content of the convention. It follows therefore that deference is owed only if it has
been practiced or agreed upon. Further, while conventional deference may often be
justified and it may justify deference of courts to the legislature even when the courts
are epistemically  superior,  in  cases  of  conventional  deference there are often good
reasons  to  change  the  convention  such  that  it  will  promote  (or  be  conducive  to)
epistemic  concerns.  A  change  in  the  convention  (e.g.,  the  convention  requiring
deference  on  the  part  of  the  court)  such  that  it  will  better  address  epistemic
considerations has benefits  (in terms of  the quality of  the resulting decisions)  and,
consequently, it may be a desirable change.
18 Yet there can be another type of reasons for robust deference. To a large extent the
division of labor between the legislature and the courts, rests upon what I will label
natural robust deference. Natural robust deference suggests that certain institutions by
virtue of  who they  are and what  they  represent have natural  functions in the society
which should give rise to deference on the part of other institutions.  In such cases
deference is not conventional;  it  is  the byproduct of certain natural features of the
institutions resulting from their particular function or their symbolic status. 
19 Think  of  the  legislature;  Kyritsis  recognizes  that  the  legislature  ought  to  have  a
prominent role in governing not because (or not only because) it is more likely to make
the right decisions or even because of particular conventions requiring deference to
the  legislature.  Instead,  Kyritsis  points  out  that  “legislatures  are  representative
institutions”.11 They bear close institutional relation to the electorate which is absent in
the case of courts. The deference that courts owe to the legislature rests on the special
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status  of  the  legislature  as  a  body  representing  the  electorate.  Representative
institutions are ones that secure individual independence which is conducive also to
political stability.12 Consequently, courts owe robust deference not merely because of
an agreement or a conventional understanding but because of the particular nature of
the  legislature,  in  particular  for  the  reason that  the  legislature  is  a  representative
institution. 
20 Kyritsis believes that courts owe robust deference to the legislature not merely because
it  is  practiced  in  a  particular  legal  system or  because  such  a  deference  shows  the
willingness of courts to be a partner in the enterprise of governing. In addition, robust
deference of courts to the legislature is a byproduct of the fact that the legislature is a
representative institution and that representative institutions have prerogatives that
other  institutions  do  not  have  (even  when  those  other  non-representational
institutions are superior decision-makers). 
21 Judicial  deference  to  the  legislature  has  traditionally  been  considered  to  be  an
important virtue of courts. It rests on the fact that courts are not representative and
that, as a general rule, courts ought to defer to representative institutions. In a famous
decision, Lord Hope explained that courts should “defer, on democratic grounds, to the
considered opinion of the elected body as to where the balance is to be struck between
the rights of the individual and the needs of society”.13 Bickel famously coined the term
‘passive virtues’ to capture the very same sentiment.14
22 Hence,  Kyritsis’s  focus  on  the  judicial  deference  to  the  legislature  follows  a  long
tradition. Courts and theorists defend the duty of courts to defer to the legislature.
Terms such as ‘judicial restraint’ or the ‘passive virtues’ have been invented to refer to
the duty of courts to defer to other institutions including in particular the legislature.
It is less fashionable to speak of the deference of the legislature to the court. I  will
however argue in the next part that legislatures have a natural duty of deference to the
courts. 
 
3 Robust Duty of Deference owed to the Court
23 In his discussion of moral and constitutional rights, Kyritsis makes the following claim: 
Effective protection of people’s fundamental moral rights is an important aim of
the  entire  legal  order,  not  only  courts.  Hence  on  this  conception  judicial
enforcement – and the procedural right to demand it – is treated as merely one
strategy for checking the legislature. This does not mean that our rights are left
unprotected. Where courts cannot tread, other institutions may have to take up.15
24 I  disagree  with  one  important  observation  in  this  paragraph.  I  disagree  with  the
observation that in protecting our moral rights, courts are merely ‘one strategy.’ As a
matter of fact, I wish to defend the view that courts are the preferred (although not the
only) strategy for protecting our moral rights and I shall also argue that due to their
privileged status, they are owed robust natural duty of deference when moral rights are
at  stake.  While  the concept of  legislative deference to the courts  is  less  popular in
scholarly or in judicial circles than judicial deference, it is important for a liberal polity.
16 
25 Judicial  deference  as  argued  above  is  a  byproduct  of  the  institutional  role  of  the
legislature as a representational institution. The legislature is owed deference because
it  represents  the  citizens.  In  contrast,  I  shall  argue,  the  Court  is  owed  deference
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precisely  because  it  is  a  non-representative  body.  Its  decisions  embody  the
understanding that our basic moral rights do not hinge on popular sentiments; citizens
have  no  power  to  change  them  or  amend  them  and  their  mandatory  force  is
independent of what people want or even judge to be true or just. Representation is
therefore  the  ultimate  grounds  for  both  judicial  deference  to  the  legislature  and
legislative deference to the court. In the former case, representation entails a duty of
deference  to  the  representational  body  (the  legislature)  while  in  the  latter  case,
representation  entails  a  duty  of  deference  to  the  non-representational  body  (the
courts).17 
26 To illustrate the distinctive features of courts which should give rise to deference, let
us  use  an  example.  In  Texas  v.  Johnson  the Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
invalidated prohibitions on desecrating the American flag. This decision was based on
the  First  Amendment  of  the  US  Constitution prohibiting  limitations  on  freedom of
expression.  The  prohibitions  on  desecrating  the  flag  reflected  prevailing  public
sentiments  and they  were  enacted in  most  US  states.  The  intensity  of  the  popular
sentiment supporting such prohibitions is evident even after Texas v. Johnson.18 
27 Assume  that  instead  of  challenging  the  constitutionality  of  the  prohibition  on
desecrating the flag in Court, political activists succeeded in abolishing the prohibitions
in  all  states  by  convincing the  public  that  the  prohibitions  are  unconstitutional  or
simply immoral. In line with Kyritsis, one may argue that this method is as good (if not
better)  as  the  constitutional  challenge  in  the  Court.  After  all,  in  Kyritsis’  view,
“effective protection of people’s fundamental moral rights is an important aim of the
entire legal order, not only courts”. Hence, as long as protection of the right to free
speech  is  effectively  provided  by  legislatures,  it  is  as  good  as  protection  which  is
provided by the Court.
28 I  disagree;  I  think  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  a  society  in  which
fundamental moral rights are effectively protected by the legislature and a state in
which fundamental  moral  rights are protected by the judiciary.  Even if  legislatures
should and ought to take moral rights into account, legislation is often motivated by
concerns about the public good. It is always an open question whether a decision made
by the legislature rests on fundamental rights or simply on concerns for efficiency or
utility.19 In contrast a decision by the Court that a law is invalid on the grounds that it
violates a constitutional right cannot but be interpreted as pronouncing the view that
the prohibition is a violation of the right at stake. 
29 Hence, while a judicial decision which pronounces that prohibiting the burning of the
flag is unconstitutional conveys unambiguously the message that the prohibition on
burning the flag is a wrong, a decision on the part of the legislature can always be
rationalized in other ways. A court declaring that the statute prohibiting the burning of
the flag is invalid on the grounds that it conflicts with basic rights makes a clear and
non-ambivalent  assertion  that  the  state  is  bound  not  to  enact  such  a  statute.  By
invalidating the statute, the court affirms that the state has a duty not to enact such a
statute because it violates a right. No such implication follows from a decision by the
legislature to abolish the prohibition. Thus it is wrong to maintain that a legislative
decision to protect my right to burn the flag is as good as a judicial decision to protect
such a right. Admittedly in both cases I can burn the flag without being subjected to
criminal sanctions. Yet the grounds of the former decision can be that the legislature
has indeed a power to prohibit the burning of the flag but it decided not to use its
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powers. In contrast, the grounds of the latter decision are that the legislature itself is
bound to protect the right to burn the flag and that the prohibition is  therefore a
violation of a fundamental right. Hence the legislature has no prerogative to impose
such a prohibition; it is beyond its powers. 
30 Consider the following analogy borrowed from Why Law Matters.20 A needs $100 to cover
some urgent costs. Fortunately, B owes A $100 and A turns to B to get his money back. B
denies that he owes A the money, but, as a gesture of friendship, is willing to grant A
$100 ‘as a present’, as B professes to understand that A faces economic hardship.
31 A is justifiably resentful and perhaps furious. A cares not merely that the $100 be given
to him to cover his urgent costs, but also that it be given to him as a repayment of a
debt rather than a present. A wants B to repay a debt, rather than merely to get the
money. I argued in Why Law Matters that this analogy can help us to understanding the
nature of  mandatory constitutional  provisions  as  those  are  intended to  convey the
clear message that the legislature is bound by its rights-based duties. Here I would extend
it and argue that judicial review is an institutional method which manifestly conveys
the existence of a duty on the part of the legislature to act or not to act in certain ways.
In this respect it is fundamentally different from a legislative decision even when the
judicial and legislative decisions are identical in their content.
32 Challenging  a  legislative  decision  in  the  Court  is  fundamentally  different  than
amending  a  law  through  democratic  means.  By  amending  the  law,  the  legislature
conveys the idea that it has powers to reenact it if it so wishes. In contrast, a challenge
concerning the constitutionality of a statute should be equated with a pronouncement
that the statue is impermissible; that the legislature has no power to legislate it; that it
violates  fundamental  moral  rights  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  remedied  even  if  the
majority thinks or judges otherwise. 
33 The difference between legislative and judicial decisions has important ramifications. It
is sometimes justified to try and change a statute through democratic means but it is
not justified to challenge the law in court. More interestingly, this difference between
the legislature and the judiciary raises doubts concerning the established view that
changing  a  law  through  democratic  means  is  at  least  prima  facie  superior  to
challenging  it  in  court  as  the  former  practice  is  somehow  more  respectful  of
democracy. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes better to successfully challenge a statute
in court than to amend it in the legislature as a judicial decision to invalidate a statute
on constitutional grounds constitutes an unambiguous pronouncement that the statute
is not only undesirable or inefficient. Instead, it implies that it is a violation of a right
and that the legislature has no power to pass it. 
34 This  finding  is  particularly  true  in  cases  of  fundamental  moral  rights.  In  cases
concerning foundational moral rights the Court has a distinctive constitutional role; its
role is not only to protect the moral right but to protect it in the right way, namely in a
way that conveys the message that rights are mandatory constraints on the powers of
the state; that they are not contingent on the good will on the part of the state or on
the moral judgments of people. 
35 The observation has important implications concerning deference. It implies that the
legislature has a duty of robust deference owed to the judiciary. Even if the legislature
is better able and willing to identify and enforce our moral rights, it still owes a duty of
deference to the Court as legislative intervention in the judicial decision undermines
the distinctive function of courts as implicitly pronouncing the counter-majoritarian
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presuppositions of liberalism. The special status of the courts with respect to rights
indicates that rights exist and that their force does not hinge on public sentiments;
they bind us willy-nilly and independently of our preferences or judgments. 
36 This finding reveals an unfamiliar deficiency of democracy (understood as a majority
rule). In pointing out the oppressive nature of democracy, theorists often pointed out
that democracy may prioritize the interests of majorities (and, at times, the interests of
well-organized powerful minorities over those of dispersed unorganized majorities).
Yet the analysis proposed above has exposed an additional concern; in the absence of
judicial  review,  the  rights  of  individuals  in  a  democracy  are  contingent  on  the
judgements and inclinations of the majority. Even if the majority protects these rights
vigorously (and is likely to do so in the future), it is still the case that individuals’ rights
are  a  byproduct  of  choice  or  discretion  rather  than that  of  a  duty.  This  is  a  non-
contingent  deficiency  of  democratic  institutions.  Even  if  the  legislature  is  highly
enlightened and is devoted to the protection of rights and justice, it is still the case that
granting it  powers  over  our  rights  has  detrimental  effects.  The mere fact  that  our
rights are at the mercy of the legislature is a deficiency that needs to be addressed.
Judicial review is needed not (only) to protect our rights as those can be protected by
an enlightened legislature; they are needed to convey the idea that those rights are not
contingent  on  the  views  or  judgments  of  the  majority  or  on  prevailing  public
sentiments. 
37 If this is right it has important ramifications concerning the duties of the legislature;
more specifically, the legislature has duties of robust deference to the Court. When a
moral right is at stake, it is primarily the role of the Court to determine its scope and its
intensity.  The legislature ought  to  defer  to  the judgments  of  the Court  even if  the
legislature is better at identifying the content of the right. Precisely as the legislature
being a representative institution is owed deference on the part of the courts, it is also
the  case  that  the  Court  being  a  non-representational  institution is  owed a  duty  of
deference on the part of the legislature.
 
4 Conclusion 
38 Kyritsis’  methodological starting point rests upon the conviction that constitutional
instrumentalism is false and that the desirability of legal and political institutions does
not hinge merely on the prospects that these institutions are conducive to epistemic or
other instrumental concerns. Instead, various institutions that are typically perceived
as means designed to achieve epistemic ends are valuable for intrinsic institutional
reasons. 
39 As is evident in this commentary, I endorse this starting point.21 As a matter of fact, I
used this starting point to extend and deepen Kyritsis’ conclusions concerning robust
deference. Robust deference is owed not only to legislature but also to courts as courts
have a distinctive role in protecting moral rights in a liberal democracy. 
40 To the extent that there is a disagreement between me and Kyritsis this disagreement
concerns Kyritsis’ belief that 
Effective protection of people’s fundamental moral rights is an important aim of
the  entire  legal  order,  not  only  courts.  Hence  on  this  conception  judicial
enforcement – and the procedural right to demand it – is treated as merely one
strategy for checking the legislature.22
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41 In contrast to Kyritsis, I believe that judicial review is not merely one strategy but the
strategy  by  which  moral  rights  should  be  protected.  While  it  is  important  that
fundamental moral rights be protected by all branches of government, the court has a
special  institutional  role  in  protecting these  rights  and hence,  the  legislature  owes
‘robust deference’ to the court when fundamental moral rights are at stake.
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